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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2A-3(2)(k) (1994) confer
jurisdiction on the Utah Court of Appeals, inasmuch as this is a case transferred
to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

These Respondents contend that Appellant has failed to accurately set forth
the standard of review applicable to the issues which she raises in her Brief and
by her appeal, contrary to the express provisions of Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such violation constitutes cause for Appellant's
Brief to be disregarded or stricken (Utah R. App. P. 24(j)) and has forced the
Respondents to speculate as to the exact basis for Appellants appeal and to provide
the Court of Appeals with the missing standards of review required for
consideration of the trial court's findings. Appellant has also failed to show, by
citation to the record, or otherwise, that the issues raised in her Brief were
preserved at the trial court level. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5).
Appellant's Brief lists six (6) separate issues for review. The involvement
of these Respondents (referred to throughout this Brief as "Respondents"),
including the Endrody Trust, its trustee and various beneficiaries, is limited to
the first issue raised in Appellant's Brief, which asserts that the trial court did not
make adequate findings to support its decision and which also appears to assert
that the trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the
scope of Respondents' Brief, in responding to Appellant's Brief, is limited to the
adequacy of the trial court's findings and the evidence which supports those
findings with respect to the trial court's decision that the assets of the Endrody
Trust are the trust's separate property, are not marital assets of Appellant
Carolyn Marie Endrody (hereafter referred to as "Mrs. Endrody") and
Respondent Laszlo Endrody, Jr. (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Endrody"), and
l

are not available for distribution between those parties in their divorce action.
Respondents will not address the other five (5) issues raised in Mrs. Endrody's
Brief, except insofar as such other issues may relate to these Respondents.
In light of the limited scope of this Brief, the issues presented and the
corresponding standards of review are as follows:
(1)

Whether the trial court made adequate factual findings regarding the

Endrody Trust's creation and its ownership of property and assets, to enable the
Court of Appeals to ensure that the trial court's discretionary rulings were
rationally based on the applicable factors for determining the ownership of
property and assets, or, if the trial court's pronounced findings are found to be
inadequate, whether the trial court record is clear and uncontroverted and/or
unstated findings can be reasonably implied. The standard of review is a clearly
erroneous standard. Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990); Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.
1993).
(2)

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the

following property is the separate property of the Endrody Trust: real property
known as "Endrody Ranch" or the "Ranch Property", the Cedar City home, the
Enoch home, the five (5) acre parcel, the Blue Sky Drive condominium (sold
during pendency of trial court proceedings), cattle and items of equipment. The
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard, with deference to the trial
court's findings of fact. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994);
Howell v. HowelL 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.) cert denied. 817 P.2d 325 (Utah
1991).
(3)

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that property and assets

owned by Endrody Trust were the separate properties of the trust and were not
marital assets subject to, or available for, division between Mrs. Endrody and
2

Mr. Endrody in connection with their divorce proceedings. The standard of
review is an independent review for correctness. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d
1065 (Utah App. 1994); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234
(Utah App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991).
(4)

Whether Mrs. Endrody has met her burden, or is capable of meeting

her burden, of showing that the trial court abused its discretion as to any of its
findings or erred as to any of its conclusions, given the absence of the complete
transcript from the trial court hearing on November 29, 1993. The standard of
review is an independent application of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
the facts and record of this case. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d
847 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. P. 11(e).
(5)

Whether Mrs. Endrody has failed to marshal the evidence in this

case. The standard of review is an independent application of the Trial Court
Record to the issues raised by Mrs. Endrody. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836
(Utah App. 1991).
(6)

Whether Mrs. Endrody's appeal of the trial court's decision relating

to the Endrody Trust is frivolous, entitling Respondents to an award of
reasonable attorneys fees and costs expended in this appeal. The standard of
review is an independent application of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
the facts and record of this case. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d
847 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. P. 33 and 34.
RULES, STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
The authorities considered to be determinative of the issues raised in this
appeal include Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); Utah R. App. P. 33; Utah R. App. P. 34;
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d
235, 237 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980);

3

24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 896 (1990); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §
101 (1992); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 106 (1992). Citations will occur in the text
of Respondents' Brief. Certain of the authorities referred to in this Brief are
reproduced, in their entirety, in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal was taken by Mrs. Endrody from a Judgment and Decree
entered on the 3rd day of October, 1994, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in
and for Iron County, State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves. The case is
essentially a divorce case, primarily involving issues of property division and
spousal support, together with claims by Mrs. Endrody that she is entitled to a
distribution of the assets of the Endrody Trust, based on her contention that such
assets are somehow marital assets.
Respondents dispute the facts set forth in Mrs. Endrody's Brief, under the
heading Statement of the Case, inasmuch as such statements and facts deviate from
the evidence placed before the trial court and selectively misstate, mischaracterize
and take out of context the evidence, findings and holdings in this case.l
Respondents adopt and incorporate the statement of facts and findings set
forth in the trial court's Memorandum Decision (R 542-553, attached to
Respondents' Brief as Addendum A), as the Statement of the Facts applicable to
this case, with the exception of the following fact, which replaces and modifies
any inconsistent findings contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision:
(A)

The Defendant transferred his 1/3 interest in the ranch property to

1

Respondents will not attempt to address the numerous inaccurate statements and
misrepresentations contained throughout Appellant's Brief. Such an undertaking would be
extremely unfair and burdensome for Respondents, and should not be essential to the
disposition of this case by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as the standards of review
applicable to the issues raised by Appellant's appeal appear calculated to protect
Respondents from such unfounded and erroneous representations. Respondents have,
however, taken extra care to provide the Court of Appeals with extensive citations to the
Trial Court Record, in response to this concern.
4

the Endrody Trust on or about October 9, 1984, as a result of which all of the
Ranch property had been conveyed to the Endrody Trust. (TE-D24 (Warranty
Deed); R 575, f 2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court made specific and detailed findings concerning the

creation of the Endrody Trust and its ownership and acquisition of property and
assets. These findings are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision (R
542), the transcript from a hearing held on November 29, 1993 (R 1365) and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 574). The detail and specificity of
the trial court's findings enable the Court of Appeals, in reviewing this matter, to
ensure that the trial court's discretionary rulings were rationally based on the
applicable factors for determining ownership of the property and assets.
II.

The trial court is entitled to exercise broad discretion in divorce

matters and the trial court's Findings of Fact in divorce cases are given great
deference and are not to be overturned unless found to be clearly erroneous.
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993). Based on evidence presented
to the trial court, it determined that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust
and is the owner of property known as the Endrody Ranch, together with a home
in Cedar City, a home in Enoch, a 5 acre parcel, a condominium on Blue Sky
Drive (sold during the pendency of the trial court proceedings), and various
cattle and items of equipment.
The findings of the trial court with respect to this issue are detailed and
specific, and are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision (R 542), the
hearing transcript dated November 29, 1993 (R 1365) and the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R 574), which incorporates the Memorandum Decision.
In addition, as it relates to the Endrody Trust's creation and ownership of
property and assets, the evidence presented to the trial court, as demonstrated by
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the Trial Court Record, is clear and substantially uncontroverted.
The findings of the trial court are based on evidence which generally
includes documents evidencing ownership of real property (TE-D24-Endrody
Ranch; TE-D26-Cedar Home; TE-D27-5 acres; TE-D28-Enoch Home; TE-P7Blue Sky Drive condominium), documents evidencing the creation and operation
of the Endrody Trust (TE-P9-Trust Agreement; TE-PlO-Resignation and
Appointment of Successor Trustee; TE-P12-Lease Agreement on Ranch property;
TE-P5 and P14- Endrody Trust Income Tax Returns (1985 through 1990, and
1992)), documents showing the payment of rent from Mr. Endrody to the
Endrody Trust for occupancy and use of trust properties (TE-P5 and PI 4Endrody Trust Tax Returns (1985 through 1990, and 1992); TE-P2 and P3-Mr.
and Mrs. Endrody's personal tax returns) and significant amounts of testimony
from Mr. Endrody, Patty Heinz (successor trustee), Matilda Endrody (a Trustor)
and attorney Kent Corry (Trust formation counsel).
Based upon the testimonies and exhibits placed before the trial court, its
findings with respect to the creation and the property/assets of Endrody Trust do
not constitute an abusive of discretion, but are fully supported by said
documentation and evidence. Furthermore, the evidence on this issue is
uncontroverted, enabling the Court of Appeals to reasonably imply findings,
should it find the trial court findings inadequate. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah App. 1993).
III.

Upon finding the Endrody Trust was the owner of the Endrody

Ranch, the Cedar City home, the Enoch Home, the 5 acre parcel, the Blue Sky
Drive condominium, certain cattle and items of equipment, the trial court also
determined that this separate property of Endrody Trust did not constitute
marital assets and was not subject to, or available for, division between the
divorcing parties. The trial court's conclusion was correct, inasmuch as the
6

above assets were the separate property of the Endrody Trust, and were not
marital assets, subject to property division in the divorce proceedings of Mrs.
Endrody and Mr. Endrody. This decision of the trial court is consistent with the
evidence placed before the trial court, and is squarely within the confines of legal
precedent.
IV.

Mrs. Endrody has failed to carry the burden of showing an abuse of

discretion by the trial court, with respect to its findings and, furthermore, it
appears that such a showing by Mrs. Endrody is not possible, inasmuch as Mrs.
Endrody has failed to fulfill her obligation of providing the appellate court with a
full and complete transcript or record of the trial court proceedings.
Specifically, this case came before the trial court on November 29, 1993,
for an additional day of trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited issues left
unresolved by the trial court's Memorandum Decision. The transcript of this
hearing, as contained in the Trial Court Record, contains only the trial court
Judge's ruling, and excludes the presentation of any evidence or any other
proceedings before the Court on November 29, 1993.
In the absence of a complete record, it must be presumed that the trial
court's ruling was based on sufficient facts and evidence. State v. $9,199.00, 791
P.2d 2213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847
(Utah App. 1990); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
V.

As the party seeking to overturn the trial court's factual findings,

Mrs. Endrody has the burden of marshaling the evidence which supports the trial
court's findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the trial
court's findings are nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Merely restating the
theories upon which Mrs. Endrody relied and which Mrs. Endrody advanced in
7

the trial court; ignoring the evidence received by the trial court, while
referencing only the portions of the record which appear favorable to Mrs.
Endrody; or simply dismissing the evidence presented to the trial court as being
unpersuasive or insufficient because it is contrary to the claims and theories
advanced by Mrs. Endrody, constitutes failure to marshal the evidence.
Substantial evidence exists and was presented to the trial court showing that
the assets claimed by Endrody Trust are, in fact, the separate properties of
Endrody Trust and are not marital assets of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody,
despite Mrs. Endrody's refusal to recognize and address that evidence. The
overwhelming majority of this evidence was uncontroverted and wholly
consistent with the trial court's findings and conclusions.
VI.

Extensive evidence, both documentary and oral, was presented to the

trial court regarding the creation and operations of Endrody Trust, together with
its unquestioned ownership of property and assets. This evidence was essentially
undisputed by Mrs. Endrody at the trial court level. Mrs. Endrody's appeal of
the trial court's decision with respect to Endrody Trust is frivolous and without
merit and the Respondents are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs expended in this appeal, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure
33 and 34.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED FINDINGS WHICH
ENABLE THE COURT OF APPEALS TO ENSURE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETIONARY RULINGS WERE RATIONALLY BASED AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The trial court made specific and detailed findings regarding the creation
and operations of Endrody Trust and its ownership of property and assets. The
findings of the trial court are set out in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Because the trial court issued an extensive Memorandum Decision (R 4608

87), which contains a statement of the facts of the case as found by the trial court
after trial, the facts and findings contained therein were incorporated into the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A (R 575). In fact, Mrs.
Endrody's counsel discussed such an incorporation of the Memorandum Decision
with the trial court judge. (R 1372-73). Additional findings of the trial court are
contained in the incomplete hearing transcript for November 29, 1993. (R 136575)
A sample of the findings made by the trial court with regard to the
Endrody Trust property, and references to those findings within the Trial Court
Record, are as follows:
A.

CREATION AND VALIDITY OF ENDRODY TRUST

The Endrody Trust was created by written trust agreement in 1984, and
Mr. Endrody and the trustors (Mr. Endrody's parents) conveyed their interest in
the ranch property to Mr. Endrody as trustee of Endrody Trust. (R 463). The
trial court further found that Mr. Endrody had ceased acting as trustee of the
Endrody Trust "and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed
as trustee." (R 466)
The trial court further found that the Endrody Trust was a valid inter
vivos trust and "was treated by all concerned as a separate legal entity, the proper
forms were observed, and the defendant [Mr. Endrody] was under a continuing
duty as trustee to perform properly his fiduciary duties." (R 480)
B.

OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY

In addition to other findings, the trial court made the following findings
with respect to the Endrody Trust's ownership of real property:
1. Ranch Property. The ranch property was purchased by Mr.
Endrody's parents in 1970, as they made the down payment of
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$25,000.00 and paid the property off with annual payments. (R 462)
Mr. Endrody paid rent to his parents for the right to occupy and use
the ranch property, which rent was almost sufficient to make the
annual payments, but did require that his parents contribute some of
their own funds in order to make those annual payments. (R 462)
The trustors of the trust and Mr. Endrody conveyed their interest in
the ranch property to the Endrody Trust when the trust was created.
(R 463, 575) Thereafter, Mr. Endrody paid rent for his use of the
property to the Endrody Trust. (R 481-482)
2. Cedar City home. This home was acquired in 1982 by Mrs.
Endrody and Mr. Endrody, with marital funds and title to the home
was taken in the names of the parties minor children-Michael and
Linda, with Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody as trustees. (R 468).
The trial court also found that this home was conveyed to the
Endrody Trust in 1988, with the agreement of both Mrs. Endrody
and Mr. Endrody and Mrs. Endrody was issued 70 trust shares as a
result of said conveyance. (R 468) Thereafter, the parties paid rent
and have been assessed rent during any occupancy. (R 468)
3. Five (5) Acres. "During the marriage the defendant (Mr.
Endrody) bought 5 acres of land in Enoch City which was paid for
with [Endrody] Trust funds and deeded to the defendant as trustee
for the Trust." (R 468)
4. Enoch City home. The Enoch home was purchased during the
marriage, was paid for by Endrody Trust funds and title taken by
Mr. Endrody as trustee for the trust. (R 468) As with the Cedar
City home, the parties were assessed rent during any periods of
occupancy, including Mrs. Endrody's occupancy during the .
approximately three (3) years in which this case was pending in the
trial court. (R 468) The trial court further found that the Endrody
Trust had continued to assess rent during the pendency of this action,
at the previously agreed-upon rate; that rent obligations up to
December 31, 1991, were the obligation of Mr. Endrody as a means
of temporary support; and that Mrs. Endrody should be responsible
for payment of one-half of the rent owed during the years 1992 and
1993, with Mr. Endrody responsible for the other half. (R 1368)
The court found the amount of rent owed to the trust for occupancy
of the Enoch home during 1992 and 1993 to be $20,400.00 ($850.00
per month for 24 months). (R 578)
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5. Blue Skv Drive condominium. "During the marriage the
[Endrody] Trust bought a home on Blue Sky Drive in Enoch City
which was paid for with Trust funds and for the use of which the
Trust collected rent. That home has been sold be [sic] the Trust,
through Patty Heinz as trustee, during the pendency of these
proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust." (R 469)
C.

OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT AND CATTLE

The trial court made the following finding with respect to equipment:
With regard to the equipment that we've discussed this morning,
there is no dispute as to the list of equipment or as to the values. (R
1366 (Hearing Transcript, November 29, 1993 , page 2))
This finding was made after trial had been completed, in August of 1993, and
after the November 29, 1993, hearing, during which the trial court received
additional evidence. (R 530) Throughout these proceedings, it was
uncontroverted that the Endrody Trust was the owner of certain pieces of
equipment, which equipment was not disputed as the court considered and divided
the list of equipment agreed upon by the parties. (R 1366)
No findings were made with respect to the Trust's ownership of cattle,
however, as set forth hereafter, the only evidence presented to the trial court was
uncontroverted with respect to this subject, and Mrs. Endrody did not dispute that
Mr. Endrody had sold all of the parties cattle prior to trial, leaving only Trust
cattle at the ranch property.
D.

SEPARATENESS OF ENDRODY TRUST

The trial court made the following findings regarding the separation of
Endrody Trust from the personal affairs of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody:
1. After the creation of the Trust, the defendant [Mr. Endrody]
continued to make improvements to the Ranch, to buy and sell farm
equipment, to supply the seed, labor and electrical power needs of
the Ranch, to farm and raise livestock, and to pay rental payments to
the Trust for the use of the land and water. (R 464-65)
li

2. The parties and the Trust filed separate tax returns,. . . (R 465)
3. The [Endrody] Trust was treated by all concerned as a separate
legal entity, the proper forms were observed, and the defendant [Mr.
Endrody] was under a continuing duty as trustee to perform
properly his fiduciary duties. The defendant bought and sold and
financed and paid for property as trustee of the trust and there is no
showing that he commingled the affairs of the Trust and his personal
affairs. (R 480)
The trial court's Memorandum Decision also includes the following
findings regarding the payment of rent by Mr. Endrody to the Endrody Trust:
Inherent in plaintiffs position is the claim that the payments of rent
which the parties made to the Trust for the use of Trust property
were somehow improper and constituted impermissible augmentation
of the Trust with marital property. . . . The evidence has convinced
this court that the rental agreements were legitimate bargains
between the parties and the Trust, even though defendant acted on
both sides of the transactions. In each instance the parties were
granted a leasehold interest in the property in question, be it a house
or the Ranch. The parties actually paid the rent and were held
responsible by the Trust for those payments, the court finds that the
plaintiff has failed to prove that the rents were unreasonable or that
they were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable
value which both parties enjoyed. In essence, the Trust was in the
same position as any other landlord vis-avis these parties. (R 48182)
The clearly erroneous standard which is required of Mrs. Endrody, if she
is to show that the trial court's findings are insufficient, is only met if a trial
court finding violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 476
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Insofar as this standard places a burden on Mrs. Endrody, she has clearly failed
to carry that burden, inasmuch as no showing has been made that the trial court
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violated any standards set by the appellate court, nor has there been a showing
that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence-which
consideration is dealt with more fully in Argument II, infra.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT ENDRODY TRUST IS A VALID
INTER VIVOS TRUST AND THAT CERTAIN PROPERTY AND ASSETS ARE THE
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ENDRODY TRUST ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL
COURT RECORD IS CLEAR AND UNCONTROVERTED AND UNSTATED FINDINGS TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CAN BE REASONABLY IMPLIED

The trial court's findings are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence
presented during the trial court proceedings. In addition, the evidence received
by the trial court was almost entirely uncontroverted with respect to Endrody
Trust and justifies the Court of Appeals in implying reasonable findings, in the
event that the trial court findings are found to be insufficient. Hall v. Hall, supra.
A.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TRIAL COURT FINDINGS

The trial court's findings, as referenced in Argument I, supra, are
supported by the following evidence presented to the trial court:
1. Creation and Validity of Endrodv Trust. The trial court received a
copy of the Endrody Trust's Trust Agreement (TE-P9), evidencing the creation
of the trust on or about October 5, 1984 and establishing the provisions
governing that trust. In addition, the trial court heard testimony from Mr.
Endrody (TT 119), Matilda Endrody (TT 367-368, 379-380), and attorney Kent
Corry (TT 424, 433-435 and 439-440), corroborating the creation of Endrody
Trust and the intent of the Trustors, Matilda Endrody and Laszlo Endrody, Sr.,
in creating the trust. There was no contradicting evidence presented to the trial
court.
The trial court also received evidence showing that the Endrody Trust was
a valid inter vivos trust, which had met its required formalities. (Mr. Endrody
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TT 175-184; Patty Heinz TT 397-399; Kent Corry TT 426-428, 433-435; TE-P9,
P10) This evidence was clear and substantially uncontroverted.
2. Ownership of Property. The trial court's findings with respect to the
Endrody Trust's ownership of real property, are supported by the following
evidence:
a) Ranch Property. The ranch property was purchased by Mr.
Endrody's parents in 1970, as they made the down payment of
$25,000.00 and paid the property off with annual payments. (Mr.
Endrody TT 27-28, 31;Matilda Endrody TT 363-364, 376-378, 382383) Mr. Endrody paid rent to his parents for the right to occupy
and use the ranch property, which rent was supplemented by his
parents' contribution of their personal funds in order to make those
annual payments. (Mr. Endrody R 654, TT 28, 31, 156-158;
Matilda Endrody TT 364-365, 369-370, 377-378). The debt on the
ranch property was retired in 1981. (Mr. Endrody TT 31) Mr.
Endrody's parents, as the trustors of the trust, and Mr. Endrody
conveyed their interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust
upon its creation in 1984. (TE-D24 ) After the debt on the property
was retired, Mr. Endrody continued to pay rent on the ranch
property during all times that he used the property to conduct his
farming operations. (Mr. Endrody TT 158-159, ; Matilda Endrody
TT 367; TE-P2, P3, P5, D12 and D14) No contradictory evidence
was presented to the trial court.
b) Cedar City home. This home was acquired in 1982 by Mrs.
Endrody and Mr. Endrody, with marital funds and title to the home
was taken in the names of the parties minor children—Michael and
Linda, with Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody as trustees. (Mr.
Endrody TT 72-73; Mrs. Endrody TT 205). The home was
conveyed to the Endrody Trust in 1988, by both Mrs. Endrody and
Mr. Endrody, with Mrs. Endrody receiving 70 shares in the Trust.
(Mr. Endrody TT 80; Mrs. Endrody TT 205, 256; TE-D26)
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to Endrody Trust and have been
assessed rent during any periods of occupancy, in the amount of
$400.00 per month. (Mr. Endrody TT 163-164, 510-511; Patty
Heinz TT 391, 409). No contradictory evidence was presented to the
trial court.
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c) Five (5) Acres. The Endrody Trust bought 5 acres of land in
Enoch City which was paid for with Endrody Trust funds and
deeded to the defendant as trustee for the Trust. (Mr. Endrody TT
75-76; TE-D27). No contradictory evidence was presented to the
trial court.
d) Enoch City home. The Enoch home was purchased in 1987, was
paid for by Endrody Trust funds and title was taken by Mr. Endrody
as trustee for the trust. (TE-D28) The parties were assessed rent
during any periods of occupancy, including Mrs. Endrody's
occupancy during the approximately three (3) years in which this
case was pending in the trial court, in the amount of $850.00 per
month. (Mr. Endrody TT 162; Patty Heinz TT 391, 409-410). Mrs.
Endrody testified that she did not know whether the Endrody Trust
had purchased this home. (Mrs. Endrody TT 257). No
contradictory evidence was presented to the trial court.
e) Blue Sky Drive condominium. A condominium on Blue Sky
Drive in Enoch City, was purchased by the Trust with Trust funds
and was titled in the name of the Trust. (Mr. Endrody TT 84; TEP7) The Trust collected rent for use or occupation of the
condominium at a rate of $450.00 per month. (Mr. Endrody TT
163) This condominium was sold by the Trust, through Patty Heinz
as trustee, during the pendency of these proceedings to reduce the
debt of the Trust. (Patty Heinz TT 401; TE-P7) Mrs. Endrody
testified that she believed that the Trust had purchased this property.
(Mrs. Endrody TT 257) No contradictory evidence was presented to
the trial court.
3. Ownership of Equipment and Cattle. There is very little evidence in the
Trial Court Record regarding the equipment of the Trust. The trial court did
receive testimony that a 4630 John Deere tractor belonged to the Trust (Mr.
Endrody TT 87). In addition, there were certain items contained on the
equipment list of Mrs. Endrody which were not included in the equipment
divided between the divorcing parties due to the apparent understanding or
agreement that those items belonged to Endrody Trust. (Robert J. Overson TT
269 (referring to TE-P17)).
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After trial had been completed, in August of 1993, and at the conclusion of
the November 29, 1993, hearing, the trial court found that "With regard to the
equipment that we've discussed this morning, there is no dispute as to the list of
equipment or as to the values." (R 1366 (Hearing Transcript, November 29,
1993 , page 2)). This finding, combined with the evidence received by the trial
court, demonstrates the absence of any contrary evidence and the acquiescence of
the parties as to ownership of equipment.
Similarly, there was very little evidence concerning the Trust's ownership
of cattle. It appears that the only evidence on this subject was testimony from
Mr. Endrody and Patty Heinz, that the Trust acquired cattle from beneficiaries of
the Trust by retaining one-half of the calf crop in return for the care and feeding
of each beneficiaries' cattle. (Mr. Endrody TT 103-104, 166; Patty Heinz TT
390). There was no conflicting testimony on this subject and no dispute appears
on the record.
4. Separateness of Endrody Trust. In general, the trial court found a
separation between the affairs of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody and the affairs
of the Endrody Trust. The following evidence supports the finding of the trial
court:
a)
Mr. Endrody was consistently required to pay rent to the
Endrody Trust for use and occupancy, by him and his family, of any
Trust owned property, including rent which accrued during the
pendency of this action. (Mr. Endrody R 653, TT 28, 87-88, 98,
156-161, 185, 450, 478, 503; Patty Heinz TT 390-391; TE-P5 and
P14)
b)
Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody filed their tax returns
separately from Endrody Trust, and the tax returns verify the
payment of rent from Mr. Endrody to the Endrody Trust. (TE-P2,
P3 and TE-P5, P14)
c)
The evidence provided to the trial court, as set forth in this
Argument II, supports the findings of the trial court. In addition,
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Mrs. Endrody failed to present any evidence that would demonstrate
that Mr. Endrody failed in his duty as trustee to fulfill his fiduciary
duties. As set forth above, properties were bought, sold, financed
and paid for by the respective trustees, in the name of the Trust.
Furthermore, there was no showing that Mr. Endrody commingled
the affairs of the Trust and his personal affairs.
This evidence was, once again, uncontroverted within the Trial Court Record.
The clearly erroneous standard which is required of Mrs. Endrody, if she
is to show that the trial court's findings are improper, is only met if a trial court
finding violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah
App. 1991) (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). There is no
question that the trial court's findings conform to the appellate court's established
standards and that the findings are supported by the clear weight of the evidence,
which in most instances was uncontroverted. Therefore, the findings must be
affirmed.
B.

EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEAR AND
I INCONTROVERTED AND SUPPORTS THE REASONABLE IMPLICATION OF
ANY NECESSARY BUT UNSTATED FINDINGS

The trial court was presented with evidence which, with respect to Mrs.
Endrody's claims against Endrody Trust, was clear and uncontroverted. This
evidence included oral testimony from Mr. Endrody, Patty Heinz (trustee),
Matilda Endrody and Kent Corry (Trust formation counsel), together with
documentary evidence, including numerous Trial Exhibits. In accordance with
Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), Respondents request that the Court
of Appeals reasonably imply any necessary findings which may not have been
stated by the trial court, in the event that the Court of Appeals determines that the
trial court's findings do not provide adequate detail or specificity.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE ENDRODY TRUST IS
A VALID TRUST MANDATES ITS HOLDING THAT THE SEPARATE PROPERTY AND
ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRUST ARE NOT MARITAL ASSETS SUBJECT TO, OR
AVAILABLE FOR, DIVISION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

As a result of the trial court's findings with respect to Endrody Trust's
ownership of property and assets, as set forth in Argument I, supra, which
findings are supported by the evidence, as set forth in Argument II, supra, the
trial court ultimately held that "[t]he plaintiff has been unable to direct the court
to any authority which would allow this court to invalidate or set aside the Trust
under the circumstances of this case", (R 478) and "the Trust is a valid inter vivos
trust and that the claims of the plaintiff against the Trust, its beneficiaries, and its
trustee are unsupported. Those claims are hereby ordered dismissed." (R 480)
A.

THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ENDRODY TRUST IS NOT SUBJECT TO OR
AVAILABLE FOR DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS OF MRS.
ENDRODY AND MR. ENDRODY

Having so held, the trial court further held that "[accordingly the property
held by the Trust, including the 2/3 interest in the Ranch [later determined to be
the entire ranch property], the Cedar City house, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch
house, and the personal property belonging to the Trust are not available for
distribution between the parties as marital assets as those items of property belong
to a third party." (R480) This holding is correct as a matter of law, as
illustrated by 76 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation. §896 (1983), which
provides that "[s]ome property ostensibly owned by divorcing spouses may not be
divisible because it is neither marital nor separate property but is the property of
a third person." Such is exactly the situation in this case.
Mrs. Endrody's fundamental error and misunderstanding of this distinction
is typified by the statement within her brief, at page 11, that "[a] careful review
of six hundred thirty-eight (638) pages of transcript taken during the trial of this
matter does not reveal what evidence the Trial Court used to determine that the
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marital property placed in the trust was not marital property that should be
awarded to plaintiff." (Emphasis added) The trial court concluded that the
property of the Endrody Trust is that entity's separate property and is not marital
property of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody. This conclusion was supported by
the evidence and mandated by the trial court's findings. Consequently, there is no
marital property in the trust, which could, or should, be awarded to Mrs.
Endrody or Mr. Endrody.
This principle is further embodied in the cases of Hamilton v. Hamilton,
562 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328
(Utah 1980). In both of these cases the Utah Supreme Court held that the assets
which are subject to division are the marital assets which are owned or held in the
name(s) of the parties at the time of the decree or termination of the marriage.
Consistent with these cases, the assets which were acquired or conveyed into
Endrody Trust prior to the decree or termination of the marriage ot Mrs.
Endrody and Mr. Endrody are not marital assets subject to division—of this there
can be no dispute. Accordingly, none of the property and assets discussed within
this Brief can be said to constitute marital property, which is subject to division
in the parties divorce action.
Respondents do not dispute the equitable powers and obligations of the trial
court in divorce matters, and more particularly in dividing marital assets of the
parties. Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990). Furthermore,
Respondents do not dispute that, where equity requires, even the separate
property of one spouse may be divided or awarded to the other spouse. Watson
v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992). However, this line of Utah cases specifies
that "marital property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed bv
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Gardner v.
Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). Hence, the courts
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recognize that their equitable power and obligation is not limitless. By the
express language of the Utah courts, equity must be confined to the assets
possessed by the parties. Thus, property owned or possessed by persons or
entities outside of the divorcing parties should not be included.
In the instant action, neither Mrs. Endrody nor Mr. Endrody own or
possess the assets of the Endrody Trust. Mr. Endrody is a beneficiary of the
Trust and is the owner of certain shares, subject to the provisions of the trust
agreement. Consequently, the assets of Endrody Trust do not fall within the
circle of marital property, nor are such assets the separate property of either of
the divorcing parties, nor are they assets possessed by the parties and subject to
division or distribution.
It should be added that the trial court did exercise its equitable powers and
obligations by awarding Mrs. Endrody one-half of Mr. Endrody's shares in
Endrody Trust, which were acquired during the marriage, by imposition of a
constructive trust. This equitable ruling was made despite the fact that such
shares might be classified as the separate property of Mr. Endrody, obtained by
gift or inheritance. Thus the trial court awarded Mrs. Endrody an equitable
division of the assets possessed by the parties.
B.

THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH THE COURT MAY INVALIDATE. SET ASIDE
OR INVADE THE PROPERTY OR ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRUST

The trial court held that M[t]he plaintiff has been unable to direct the court
to any authority which would allow this court to invalidate or set aside the Trust
under the circumstances of this case." (TT 478) Mrs. Endrody urges the court
to set aside or invade the Endrody Trust based on one of three theories. First,
due to her belief that Mr. Endrody has placed marital assets in the Trust. The
trial court correctly held that f,[e]ven if such is the case, it is no basis for setting
aside a Trust created by third party trustors for the benefit of the parties, as well
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as other beneficiaries unrelated to this divorce action." (R 478) The trial court
was unwilling to set aside or invade the Trust based on this theory and
appropriately held that a trust may be set aside or invaded by a court only in very
limited circumstances, which circumstances did not exist in this case, and that the
court must protect and preserve the intent of the trustors. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts
§ 101 (1992).
Second, Mrs. Endrody urges the court to set aside or invade the Endrody
Trust due to alleged misconduct or violation of trust formalities by the respective
trustees. The trial court received evidence with respect to Mrs. Endrody's
allegations. (Mr. Endrody TT 175-184; Patty Heinz TT 397-399; TE-P9, P10)
76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 106 (1992), states the general rule that "[a] trust does not
terminate or lapse merely by reason of misconduct or violation of the trust by the
trustee, his inability to administer the trust, or his neglect of, inattention to, or
abandonment of the trust, or an improper lease of the trust property." The trial
court followed this general rule in rejecting Mrs. Endrody's second theory. (R
479)
Third, Mrs. Endrody urged the court to set aside or invade the Trust based
on the alter ego doctrine. The trial court refused to set aside or invade the Trust
based on this theory, due to its determination that the Trust "is obviously not the
alter ego of the defendant, even though he enjoyed broad powers as trustee and
majority shareholder of the Trust. The evidence demonstrates that the Trust
included property of other parties which was managed by defendant for the
benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries." (R 479) In addition, the alter ego
doctrine is a corporate invasion doctrine, as demonstrated by the cases cited and
summarized in Mrs. Endrody's Brief (pages 14-16). This doctrine lacks
application and legal precedent within a trust setting.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION.
INSOFAR AS NECESSARY. TO DETERMINE THAT LEASE/RENT PAYMENTS
WERE AN OBLIGATION OF MR. ENDRODY

Much is made by Mrs. Endrody of the fact that Mr. Endrody made rental
payments to the Endrody Trust for his use and possession of the Endrody Ranch
property, and for his family's use of the Cedar City and Enoch residences. Mrs.
Endrody claims that the trial court improperly considered and accepted evidence
classifying payments to Endrody Trust as rent, without requiring documentary or
written evidence to support such classification, citing the case of Godfrey v.
Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993).
Even if Mrs. Endrody's reliance on Godfrey were correct, the individual
and Trust tax returns and the lease agreement presented to the trial court (TE-P2,
P3, P5, D12 and PI4) constitute written evidence of the obligation and actual
payment of rent, particularly when combined with the testimony which explains
the reason for such payments. See Argument II.B. The trial court ultimately
found that
Inherent in plaintiffs position is the claim that the payments of rent
which the parties made to the Trust for the use of Trust property
were somehow improper and constituted impermissible augmentation
of the Trust with marital property. . . . The evidence has convinced
this court that the rental agreements were legitimate bargains
between the parties and the Trust, even though defendant acted on
both sides of the transactions. In each instance the parties were
granted a leasehold interest in the property in question, be it a house
or the Ranch. The parties actually paid the rent and were held
responsible by the Trust for those payments. The court finds that the
plaintiff has failed to prove that the rents were unreasonable or that
they were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable
value which both parties enjoyed. In essence, the Trust was in the
same position as any other landlord vis-avis these parties. (R 48182)
Furthermore, regardless of the application of Godfrey. Mrs. Endrody's
position is erroneous, as demonstrated by the case of Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d

22

540, 543 (Utah App. 1993). In Baker it was argued that an obligation owed to
the parents of the divorcing husband was not truly an obligation inasmuch as
there was no note evidencing the obligation and the only evidence presented to the
court was testimony of the divorcing husband that the monies were owed and that
he intended to pay that money back.
The Court of Appeals held that this was a bona fide marital obligation
despite the absence of written proof, because the divorcing wife knew of the
obligation and there was testimony that the divorcing husband intended to repay
the funds to his parents. The Court of Appeals also held that the oral testimony
was sufficient evidence to support the finding of an obligation and that the
evidence presented prohibited an appellate court determination that the trial
court's finding of an obligation was clearly erroneous.
A similar ruling would be required in this action, inasmuch as all evidence
presented to the trial court supports the historical payment of rent, the existence
of the agreement and obligation to pay rent, and both Mr. Endrody and the
Endrody Trust have indicated their intentions to see that the rent obligations are
paid in full.
IV.
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN AND/OR IS
INCAPABLE OF MEETING HER BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE COMPLETE TRIAL COURT
RECORD, INCLUDING A FULL TRANSCRIPT FROM THE NOVEMBER 29, 1993,
TRIAL/EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that Mrs.
Endrody request a transcript from the reporter within ten (10) days after the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, or if certain parts of the record are not to be
requested, that a certificate to that effect be filed with the Trial and Appellate
Courts. As of the date of this Brief, Mrs. Endrody has failed to request, and has
not placed in the Trial Court Record, a complete transcript from the proceedings
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before the trial court on November 29, 1993. Mrs. Endrody has also failed to
file a certificate identifying those proceedings for which transcripts would not be
produced.
The trial court's Memorandum Decision contained the Court's Findings of
Fact and its ruling as to various issues. In addition, the Court identified certain
issues which it was unable to fully resolve without additional evidence and/or
testimony, requiring additional proceedings in the case. (R 485-486) In order to
provide the parties with an opportunity to present such evidence and/or testimony
on these limited issues, the trial court scheduled an additional date for
trial/evidentiary hearing on November 29, 1993. (R 529) Sometime after that
date, and to aid in the review/preparation of Findings of Fact, Respondents
requested the preparation of a transcript from the court reporter to include only
the Judge's ruling. The evidentiary proceedings before the trial court on
November 29, 1993, were not, and have not, been reproduced and are not
contained within the Trial Court Record. The only record of those proceedings
other than the partial transcript, is a minute entry which reflects the presentation
of additional evidence. (R 530)
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[i]f
the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing
the relevant portions of the transcript." (Emphasis added)
Clearly Mrs. Endrody's appeal urges that "a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence." It is Mrs. Endrody's burden to
show that the trial court was clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.
Absent the complete transcript(s) of the trial court proceedings, the Trial Court
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Record is devoid of the arguments, testimony and evidence presented to the trial
court, and the reasoning of the trial court in making its findings and rulings. In
light of the incomplete record before the this Court, it must be presumed that the
trial court's findings and rulings were based on sufficient facts and evidence.
State v. $9.199.00. 791 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual
of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998
(Utah App.) cert, denied. 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
Consequently, Mrs. Endrody has not and cannot meet the burden required
to set aside the trial court's findings or rulings, which matters must remain as
determined by the trial court.
V.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE

As the party seeking to overturn the trial court's factual findings, Mrs.
Endrody has the burden of marshaling the evidence which supports the Court's
findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the Court's findings
are nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540, 543
(Utah App. 1994) (citing Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App.
1991)); Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). Mrs. Endrody does
not succeed in marshaling the evidence. Instead, she refers the Court of Appeals
only to the evidence which conflicts or potentially conflicts with the trial court's
findings. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989).
A review of the Trial Court Record, as summarized in Arguments II and
IE, supra, clearly demonstrates that Mrs. Endrody has merely reargued only the
evidence which she alleges to support her position, which does not constitute
marshaling of the evidence. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598 (Utah
App. 1994). In addition, Mrs. Endrody has not properly marshaled the evidence
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Fi lithermoi e. I\ li s Endrody's citation o

•

- */nee whicn Mie

considers supportive of the outcome which she ...-^i\.-. \;. ,,.

using to
,,-:: !. i aid. ^el\ in

acknowledge contrary evidence upon which the trial , on:-*

Crouse v. Grouse, S1 7 P 2d !S?o i L'ta*
In ^hort, M r

1 n-* od\ has refused \o acknowledge the evidence which
•- il-

suppo

t.ick support in the evidence. All o; the loregoing ac:- ^

i

-- •

.
-

'i«lm^s

.ndnxly

constitute a failure m n. i -hal the evidence and requuc that the Court of Appeals
lilt w *

-

vi.
/\rrm.i.^.N i ^ APPEAL OP JUL i'RiAL *:>UJ.V i\l:i
TO THE PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRL : .
LOUS AND
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY S FEES
AND COSTS EXPENDED IN THIS APPEAL.

Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "if the
1

determines that a Motion made or appeal taken, under these rules is either
AS

at I MI ii sla } it shall A\\ mil (inisl damages will in In IIIIM^

>< hide MIII'IT OH

ble costs , and/or reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The
^i- ** nay order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney. 1
In addition, Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that "...if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against Appellant
i mless oinc
The content ol \\- - numerous citations to the Trial Court Record contained
within Arguments I and II of Respondents' Brief, demonstrate the following facts
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and circumstances:
(a)

substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, both by

documents and by testimony, regarding the creation, operation and property/asset
ownership of Endrody Trust. (Argument II, supra)
(b)

Mrs. Endrody failed to dispute or controvert said evidence in any

material way, in the trial court proceedings. (Argument II, supra)
(c)

Despite the uncontroverted evidence at the trial court level, Mrs.

Endrody has appealed the trial court's findings and ruling with respect to
Endrody Trust. (Argument II, supra)
(d)

Mrs. Endrody has failed to provide the Appellate Court with a

complete record of the trial court proceedings by excluding or failing to provide
transcripts for certain hearings or portions of hearings. (Arguments II and IV,
supra)
(e)

Mrs. Endrody's has failed to marshal the evidence as demonstrated

by her Brief which excludes and fails to acknowledge the presentation of evidence
favorable to Endrody Trust and supportive of the trial court's findings and
conclusions with respect to Endrody Trust and its ownership of property and
assets. (Arguments II and V, supra)
(f)

Mrs. Endrody's Brief is riddled with deviations, misstatements and

mischaracterizations of the evidence, findings and conclusions which are
contained in the trial court proceedings. Such deviations, misstatements and
mischaracterizations are unfair to the Court of Appeals and the other litigants,
and are exposed upon actual review of the Trial Court Record.
These circumstances support the position of Respondents that Mrs.
Endrody's appeal, with respect to this issue, is frivolous and without merit.
Consequently, Respondents respectfully request that the Court award Respondents
their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
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CO IN C M I! HON

4 a ^ i *p uie lacis of this case. ;ne fore lining arguments ind the evidence
ni^

in

. i^r.

-.-

^

-v

>rd. Respondents

pectfully request uuu aie i/ian i'nun M Appeals ainrni ia^ ^ecision of the
Fifth Judicial District Court, as reflected b\ ihe inn: . am - Memorandum

i

. ; c » o i o ; i . ..'j i

••spondents nirther reuueM that uic l \ a h * • an -i Appeals award
Re^ * :u'^nts their reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result of
this appeal r\

.1.

. „ -. - / .

RESPECTFCLL , SUBMITTED this _ ? ^ day of June, 1995.
SNO^JUFFER, ENGSJRQM. DRAKE, WADE & SMART
A Professional Corporation

MICHAEL AlQA^
Attorneys foV Respon
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /

day of June. 1995.1 served lkz> (2)

full, true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS on each
of the following by depositing copies in the United States mail, at St. George,
Utah, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows:
MICHAEL W. PARK
THE PARK FIRM
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, Utah 84771-2438
LASZLO ENDRODY. JR.. Pro Se
Defendant/Respondent
P.O. Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1083
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ADDENDUM A:

Memorandum Decision

OURT
IN THE _iSTRICT COURT

'3a&3gL Anion

• : ;

'••

-rTCIAL DISTRICT

iN H N D FOR IRON - .UN';
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee
of the ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY
HEINZ, individually, ENDRODY
TRUCKING, INC.. a Utah
corporation. WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S. M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. ENDR —
DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL McGARVEY,
MATILDA McGARVEY, MICKLOS ENDROD':
MADELEIN L. ENDRODY, HEIDI
MICHELLE ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,
Defendants.
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farm was

was using his

costs associated with

running the Ranch and buying the equipment and supplies needed to
do so.
During the marriage, the defendant's annual income went from
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before going

leaves, the defendant

the Ranch, both
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manager of the Ranch,
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longer acts

as trustee of the

as
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and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed as
•trustee.
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the Trust and his

still the majority

daughter is the current trustee,
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at will.
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Harvester, the offset

used or located
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from his earnings during

hp JD 4630 tractor, the JD 3960

disc bought in
7

1970, the flatbed

trailer

turned over to
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owned

Endrody Trucking and the

Defendant testified that he had traded in machinery he

prior to

covered

horse trailer belonging

the

marriage which

was

separate property

by the premarital agreement but

speculative and unconvincing.
specific

incidents

separate property

or

and

the evidence thereon is

The defendant was unable to supply

evidence

as to

values
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the alleged

and any separate character of that property is

untraceable and has been obliterated by commingling, augmentation
and

improvement

undisputed,

using

marital

and clearly
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funds
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established by
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the evidence,

during the marriage from the
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that the

farm and from
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domestic relations order
that
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of

forwarded to
be done

during the marriage.
that

benefit

now retired

accrued

from the

as to

how much

so

of the

Plaintiff is entitled
during

Panama Canal

receives a monthly benefit of $2442 per month.
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the Commission

the

marriage.

and currently

During

the

marriage

additional properties

the

parties or

which present

the

issues

Trust

in this

acquired
case.

In

1982, the parties bought a home in Cedar City which they paid for
with

marital funds.

plaintiff

and

The

title to

the defendant

as

the home

trustees

for

children

of the parties, Michael and Linda.

created,

the Cedar

with

the

City house

agreement of

Plaintiff received
agreement

to

both

the

the

two

-che plaintiff

and

City

minor

the Trust,

the defendant.

shares in the

Cedar

by the

After the Trust was

was transferred into

70 additional

transfer

was taken

Trust upon

house

to

the

her

Trust.

Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the
house.

The

defendant

has occupied

this

home

during

these

proceedings and is being assessed rent by the Trust.
During the marriage the defendant bought 5 acres of
Enoch City

land in

which was paid for with Trust funds and deeded to the

defendant as trustee for the Trust.
During the marriage

the defendant

bought a

home in

Enoch

City, in which plaintiff has resided by order of the court during
the pendency

of these proceedings.

Trust funds and title was
Trust.

That home

was paid

taken by defendant as trustee

During the time the

parties resided in that

paid rent to the trust for the use of the premises.
the current trustee

of the Trust,

for by
for the

home, they
Patty Heinz,

has testified that

once this

9

4CQ

divorce case is

decided, the Trust will

seek the ouster

of the

plaintiff from the Enoch home and will hold defendant responsible
for

all losses

the

Trust

has

suffered during

the

time

the

plaintiff has occupied the home without paying the required rent
The 1969
asset,

it

mobile home

having

been

located

on the

Ranch is

purchased during

parties and paid for with marital

funds.

the

a

marriage

marital
by the

The larger mobile home

located on the Ranch, and occupied by defendant's mother,

is not

the property of the parties, but belongs to Matilda Endrody.
During
Drive

the Trust

bought a

in Enoch City which was paid

the use
sold

the marriage

of which the Trust

be the

Blue Sky

for with Trust funds and for

collected rent.

Trust, through Patty

home on

That

Heinz as

home has been

trustee, during the

pendency of these proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust.
Plaintiff

is currently

toward a secretarial
work
job.

force after

enrolled

degree.

that in a

in

college

She hopes to be
secretarial or

and

working

able to enter the
office manager type

Plaintiff suffers from several illnesses and takes various

medications which limit

the types of work she can

worked just prior to this

marriage.

do.

Her degree will

She last
require at

least 2 years to complete.
Defendant
the

also hopes to return to

resolution of

this case,

the work force following

although he

will not be

able to

10

dm

return ^o the Panama Canal because of his physical condition.

He

hopes to find

or

mate.

employment in the merchant

However,

custody

he is

currently caring

of the two teenage children of

quite ill and
problems

were to

go

requires lengthy absences.

back to

for and

has temporary

the parties.

requires constant care.

if he

marine as a master

Child care
sea as

Michael is

would create

that line

of work

Plainriff has indicated that she

is

not interested in taking physical custody of the children at this
time but would do so

if anything happened to the

defendant. The

parties have agreed that the court should award joint

custody to

them,

reasonable

with

physical custody

to

the

defendant and

rights of visitation to the plaintiff.
During the marriage the defendant set up a corporation known
as Endrody Trucking.
and several
The

court

The initial

later contributions
finds

that

the

contribution to that
were made from

stock

or

other

company

marital assets.
interest

in that

corporation held by either of the parties is marital property.
The parties
during

the

acquired two

marriage.

The

pick up trucks
parties

and one

have stipulated

Cadillac
that

the

Cadillac is the plaintiff's separate property and the two pick up
trucks belong to the Trust.

The 1978 Chrysler Cordoba automobile

is a marital asset having a value of $300.
At

time of

trial the

parties own
11

no cattle in

their own

name.
herd

At the time the case was filed, the parties owned a large
of cattle.

defendant

During the

has sold

those

pendency of

cattle in

violation

restraining order.

The defendant was

court following a

hearing held December

determination
hearing

all

was stayed, as
the evidence

"chese proceedings the

found in contempt
14, 1992.

the court wanted

before

of the

by the

The penalty

the advantage of

on the

deciding

court's

appropriate

penalty for the sale of the cattle.
During the

trial, plaintiff's evidence showed

incurred

attorney fees

costs in

the total amount of $1431.50.

no

evidence on

regarding the

in the

total amount

his attorney fees,
reasonableness of the

that she had

of $35,602.25

and

The defendant presented

nor did

he present evidence

fees and costs

incurred by

plaintiff.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
Plaintiff
into by

contends that

the

premarital agreement

the parties should be invalidated

under coercion

entered

because she signed it

and without full disclosure.

The courts of this

State have clearly held that antenuptial agreements are valid and
enforceable
validated

with
if the

certain

exceptions.

evidence demonstrates

Such

agreements

that the

agreement was

entered into voluntarily without coercion or fraud, and
was material disclosure of assets.

[See Nielsen v.

are

if there

Nielsen, 780

12
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P.2d 1264; Hunk v. Huck,

734 p. 2d

417; Berman v.

3erman, 749

P.2d 1271.]
The evidence in this case demonstrates no coercion, fraud or
involuntariness.

Plaintiff testified that prior

to the signing

of the agreement she was aware of the Ranch and its improvements,
having visited

there

herself.

The

agreement came

up for the first

question of

a

premarital

time in Panama just

before the

marriage was to take place but the plaintiff testified there were
no
that

threats, no
there would

ultimatum, no duress
be

no marriage

or coercion.

if she

She assumed

refused

to sign

the

agreement but the defendant made no such statement or indication.
Further, plaintiff had

no objection to signing

she assumed that the Ranch would be
defendant

after

the

continue to be hers
the

marriage,

the separate property of the

just as

after the marriage.

existence of coercion

the agreement as

her

belongings

The burden of

is born by the

would
proving

plaintiff and she has

failed to carry that burden in this case.
The

evidence in

disclosure,
disclosure

this case

however.
consists

does demonstrate

The plaintiff
of

the

overvaluation of

cattle, its

accounts and equipment.

the

of $600,000

figure

agreement.

was

He admits that the

argues

material nonthat

the

The defendant

not accurate

at

the

non-

Ranch,

its

admits that

the time

property was worth far less

of the
than

13
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<

-

that amount.

The

court holds, however,

that an error

of that

type does not constitute material non-disclosure.
The plaintiff was familiar with the property included in the
agreement.

There was

no confusion, nor was

overvaluation of that

property.

She

could keep the described property
at the value he gave it.
material

disclosure

opportunity to
agreement.
during

defendant

as his separate property

even

provide

the agreeing

party

a full

assess what he or she is giving up by signing the

disclosure the

when the

agreed that the

the

The purpose of the requirement of full,

is to

Obviously

ability to

she misled, by

if

the property

other

party

is greatly

has

been deprived

properly determine what is being

value of

the

property has

undervalued

given up.

been overstated,

of

the

However,
and

the

agreeing party decides to sign anyway, he or she has had adequate
disclosure to make a reasoned decision.
absolute accuracy

in disclosure.

The law does not require

The overvaluation of the Ranch

was not material non-disclosure as the court can presume
the

true value

of the property

had been

that if

disclosed, being less

than the amount stated, the plaintiff would have entered into the
agreement all

the more readily, as she would have been giving up

less than she chose to give up in this agreement.
The

court finds,

however, that

the agreement

executed by

these parties did not make the required material disclosure as to
14

A -'
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that portion of the document which provided:
"The parties intend and desire that ail real and personal
property on the Endrody Ranch in Iron County,
including
accounts, cattle and machinery shall remain the
separate
property of the prospective husband, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR.,
regardless of any loans or payments made on the ranch,
accounts, cattle, or machinery during the
marriage."
No

where in

nature of the
nature

the agreement is

indebtedness on the Ranch

of any accounts

evidence

is

and

now an
time

to

asset which has
of its

amounts of

the

The effect of this

In
this

or the

this case the
marriage

his earnings, which
Ranch, to buy

farming

needs

of

the
were

cattle and
the

Ranch

arrangement is that the Ranch is

escalated in value

purchase prior to

last appraisal.

or other assets

throughout

to improve the

supply

indication of the

hold or owe.

that

using large

clearly marital funds,

enterprise.

it may

persuasive

defendant was

machinery

there any

from $80,000

the marriage to

at the

$437,000 at the

The defendant has effectively provided himself a

way to transform marital earnings

into his separate property, at

will,

in connection

be simply

using the money

The agreement does not reveal that such was the
the parties.
knew of or

Nor is there any evidence
agreed to such an outcome.

to reveal that
his separate

he intended to

contemplation of

that the plaintiff ever
Failure of the defendant

make significant improvements

property from marital assets and

improvements as

with the Ranch.

his own separate

to

then to claim the

property constituted

material

15
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non-disciosure.
In addition, the enforcement of the above quoted portion
the

agreement

circumstances

would
in this

portion thereof,
Nieison v.

be

substantially

case.

unfair

Antenuptial

the

agreements, or son\e

may be invalidated because

Nielsen-, and Berman v, Berman.

under

of

of unfairness. [See
cited above.] During

the marriage the defendant earned well over $100,000 per year for
several years from his employment.

The evidence shows

that much

of that money was spent improving the Ranch and its assets, which
the defendant
upon the

expected individually

death of his parents.

provision of

to inherit,, own

Were the court

the agreement, it would result

since the controlling

interest in

other

personal property

on the

is now

held by

a

If the

machinery and

Ranch, including

its accounts,

cattle, and machinery were also to be held the
of

to enforce this

in an unfair result

the Ranch

Trust controlled largely by the defendant.

or control

separate property

the defendant, the plaintiff would walk away from 17 years of

marriage
amassed

with

precious

a considerable

result is

little
fortune

not fair and was

and the

defendant

using marital

not within the

would

funds.

have

Such

a

contemplation of the

parties at the time of the agreement.
Accordingly,

the court

holds

that the

provisions of

the

Antenuptial Property Agreement according separate property status
16

to personal

property on

the Ranch, including

and machinery regardless
during the

or payments made

marriage is unenforceable.

that any improvements
marriage

of any loans

which were

defendant's separate

to real property
paid for

thereon

Further the

court holds

of the Ranch

during tlc\e

with marital

property by

accounts, cattle,

funds are

the agreement for

not made

the reasons

cited above.
The

court

invalidates the

must

next

consider

entire premarital

whether

agreement.

The

this

holding

Utah Supreme

Court has held, in Nielson v. Nielson, :
"Where the offending provision [of an antenuptial
agreement] is separable from the rest of the contract, the
non-offending provisions are enforceable."
The

court

finds

that

the

offending

provision

in

the

agreement at hand is separable from the remaining portions of the
agreement.

Therefore,

enforceable

except as

the
to

the

agreement is

declared

offending provisions

valid

and

identified

above.
In

applying the

defendant's interest
Ranch at

agreement to the

facts in

in the real property

this case, the

which constituted the

the time of the marriage would be the separate property

of the defendant, as would any increase in value of that property
attributable solely to the independent forces of the market place

17

A~ r

and the

economy, including inflationary

Jur. 2d

Section 891, p. 372;

(Utah 1990);

Burt v.

Burt,

factors1.

Dunn v. Dunn, 802
799 P.2d

[See

24 Am.

p.2d 1314, 1320

1166, 1168

(Utah

1990)]

However, any increase in value attributable to the expenditure of
marital funds

on repairs, improvements, new

like is a marital

asset subject to division by

24 Am. Jur. 2d, Sect-ion 892; Burt v. Burt.,
Dunn, cited above.;
held

by defendant

maintained
marital

defendant.

Likewise, any
at the

separate

funds,

acquisitions or the

would

time of

and paid
remain

for
the

this court. (See

cited above; Dunn v.

interest in personal property
the

marriage and

without
separate

which was

the application
property

of

of
the

However, any interest in an item of personal property

acquired after

the marriage and paid for

by marital funds would

1

In Dunn v. Dunn, page 1320, the Court of Appeals held:
"The general rule is that equity requires that each
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the
marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property.
(Citations omitted)
Exceptions to this general rule include
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other
spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or
protected the separate property, and whether the distribution
achieves a fair, just, and equitable result."
It is clear from the evidence in this case that plaintiff
has augmented and maintained the property of the defendant by his
use of marital funds to improve his separate property.
In
addition, this court finds unfair and inequitable a property
distribution that would leave the defendant with the principle
assets of the marriage and all the value they have accrued
because he used marital funds to increase that value during the
marriage, even though one half of those funds must be attributed
to the efforts of the plaintiff.
18
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be a marital asset, subject to division by the court.
THE ENDRQDY TRUST
Much of the
creation

litigation in this case has

of the

October

5,

Endrody Trust by

1984.

At

the time

defendant and
of

Agreement, the

defendant's parents,

2/3

interest

undivided

in

transferred to the Trust.
was

held by

Trust.

defendant.

Plaintiff

the

trustee, and

Ranch.

Their

defendants

in this

lawsuit.

of its
The

the Trust
title to

interest

was

undivided interest

interest was never

some

of

as trustors, held

now attacks the Trust and has

Trust, its

his parents op

the signing

The remaining 1/3
That

been caused by the

deeded to the
even joined the

current beneficiaries

plaintiff has

as

been unable to

direct the court to any authority which would allow this court to
invalidate or set aside the Trust under the circumstances of this
case.
The plaintiff's primary complaint
placed marital assets in the Trust.
is no

basis for

trustors

for the

setting aside
benefit

beneficiaries unrelated

of

is that the defendant has

Even if such is the case, it

a Trust
the

created by

parties, as

to this divorce action.

well

third party
as

other

A court cannot

invade a trust established for a lawful purpose where there is no
showing that
influence,

the

trust

or mistake,

was

created by

unless all
19

fraud,

parties in

duress,

undue

interest consent

properly to the r e v o c a t i o n .
138)

(See 76 A m . J u r . 2d, Section 101, P.

T h e court is required to give

effect to the intent of the

trustors w h o created t h e t r u s t , absent, j/ueh \

hnwiug.

Plaint, iff h a s also pointed to some actions by
'•••

-

**

7ht^

general

because

rustee a s grounds for setting aside the trust.

of

..
•ne

inabil i ty
Jur.

s

^ha^

a

isconau.r

-

trust

of

does

the

• - 'h

short the

ivihuw Mj.il.. Ui •

to

iet.' i J ii'•*..'

trustee,

plaintiff has failed

neglect

or

(See 75 Am.

and
M M

the

alter

to apply

ego
it

doctrine

In t h .

i i o w e v p p , f V ^ n i I I In1.

ki

prevail.

- t" 1 he defendant, even though,
urn i

d e m o n s t r a t e s that

This

jse ot

consented
..-lie

Fru.
to the

is

.VJIU^-J

<,_ .

\he

law

(

iami

contribution of
i-ake itharet.

i

enefi'

*

*-

tn* .

e

cities

; • ;e 'ruse and
"•-' "~r

-v-_ aaai, • :

the Cedar
1

of

u <if> J M , the

-

proper* ie^

e

"The court

*

.-..^i-ei* .

the

*

he enjoyed broad powers

'

.igret .:! l.u

uraen to

jbvLously not the

*

w a s managed '-v defendant for

i i\ b e n e ! i c i fi i'i <

from

m i l I vi-rt

Trust

-

the Trust

her

situation.

liter ego
i,c< i rut'II^1

to carry

.* • -

jould not

"L'ruai

his

,i.ei;

plaintiff

the

terminate merely

: natter iti on to it.

"'""YiLtt, .'.huuld I. ;;

adopt

corporations

which

not

2d, Section 106, p. 1 4 1 . )
In

court

the defendant

r

tnat 3r;e

i t v house
' <-r
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w h a t e v e r interest she

might have in that

treated by

all concerned as a separate

forms were

observed, and

duty as trustee
defendant bought

Trust w a s

w a s i 11 ider

a coi i tir ining

h i s fiduciary d u t i e s .

and sold and financed and

trustee of the trust

The

legal entity, the proper

the defendai i t

to perform properly

house.

The

paid for property as

and there is no showing

that he commingled

the affairs of the Trust and h i s personal, a f f a i r s .
m

* -*->--:

vivos

t h e c oiir t

trust and

1 i o ] d s t h a t t h €^

that, the

claims of

a ^ ?a J i d i nt e r

T ru s t i s

the plain tiff

against the

Trust, its b e n e f i c i a r i e s , and its trustee are unsupported.
c 1 a i in s a r e

h e r e b ;;y o i d e r e d

d i s in i s s e d.

held b y the Trust, including the
Cedar City h o u s e , the 5 acres
,'-.•.

. .

.

dis^ric Jt: -:
items

. •

11: : *

• - /

2/ "3 interest in the Ran-:..,,, the

i n E n o c h , the Enoch h o u s e , and the

-t= — -

-

etween these

* Topeny

A c c o rd in g 1j

Those

„brt:e^

-^

. . . _ - • "

.aritai assess

:r

_;£ : nose

^eiong zo d :hira parity. (See ^ 4 4ia±. J^i . «d,

oectiun MWti. )
However, the

court also h o l d s that the

shares in the Trust

held by the defendant a s beneficiary are marita] property in view
:)f

the

fac t ti: ia t

marriage,

defendai i t

1 las increased

acqi :i :i i • 3d t h o s e

the value

of those

shar<

-

shares during

' ".e
the

marriage by the i ise of marital, funds and the application of large
amo u n t s

~:

.. • a i i d

~ \

•

o t h e i • w i s e b e J o n g i n g t : 11 i e n i a i: i i a g e,
21

Rind has r^t^rr.^d all earnings from The ^ Q r°h ^^ "•"he ^anoh and the
^r^".

to ~ ..T

. .;-

^xclusicn of plaintiff
,

-

,e

M t

.ererjv

: iers

w < . .-,- -

y

#«

mm

i'UDjeci

w - .cnsiructive *jtULit imposec . y Mile rjurt.

H e is

to hold only title to those shares in trust for the plaintiff and
s i: i e

is

1I 1 e

• :± w a. i d e d

including

voting

f ii ] 1

rights

b eiie f i t

and

the

a i: i :i

right

< ise
to

of
any

11 I o s e s h a i " e s
property

distribution attributable to those -n.ar<:^.
REEL . n — . . _
Inherent

in

.„._:
-• the

plain-: ff .• position

claim that

payments o f rent w h i c h tne p a r t i e s made uu one Trust
of

In ist

property

were

somehow

i the Tvuz-

impermissible augment at- ::.
'.-.: "

: *

ould

T r u s t . !jLj,r ... . has

' cnvmced

1 egitimate
though

r

* •

o r ^h^s ^e^ceived
court

that

between the

defendant acted

and

-;i: h marital

have trie uourb

this

bargains

3 improper

.:.:

the

parbo.ee

o n both ptidep

<->f

and
..

for the u s e
constituted
property-

< lefendai it a i: i :i i :I le

v r : /ty.
rental

the

The evidence

agreements

were

t'-.r- T n is t,

-n

transactions.

in

each instance

the parties were

-^ranto-* • leasehold

interest in

tl: le property

j n iiiest ion,

n

Ranch ,

parties actually

t :! 3: rove

a

.

UUUB-

paid the rent and w e r e

Trust for those p a y m e n t s .
fai led

ue

The

\e,,; .^sponsible by the

The -. :;ur+ fii.ds tuat -he* plaintiff h a s

i :,ha t i ::.he r

•

22
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t they

were

not given

in exchange for

v a 11 1 e wh i c h b : 11 I i ; a r t i e s

a return

enj oye d

benefit of comparable

I n e s s e n c e , 1: h e T ri i s t

>/ a s i :i i

the same p o s i t i o n a s a n y other l a n d l o r d v i s - a - v i s these p a r t i e s .

ENPRODY TRUCKING CORPORATION
* "l " *' 4 ; 4 j

P 1 a i n t :i f f"" s s e c o n d ame n d e d c o m.p 1 a i n t a 1 ] e g e s t h a"
known

as Endrody

property.
s 1 Io 111 d

(hereinafter

"Corp.")

The plaintiff does not allege that • h !: e

applied I i

Piei ced or that

' n i - "\ae .

presented w» : :
:)tl: lei

Trucking

; ;

nas oeen

"ur 1 - i o r i r

ustify

i n t h e nan *"•

r.e i *n " ies

•
.o

r -aock : .i

f

nai

"ori

e

*v.aence
the

. - . * . .

* * * iet^rdarv.

m a r i t a l p r o p e i • to

o r ^ c r a i e veil

- • -.: s ^ : u r 1

:
fc

uarioal

"

Jertsir.lv " ner

I: iai:

interest (t

the a 11ei

^

y

whether a c q u i r e d

* 'he ^lav^iff.

must

I iav:i i ig b e e n acqi l i i e :i wj t l i niai :i t a ]

bQ "^eated a s
fi m d s .

RETIREMENT
The part ies have st ipulated that the part ies are ent itled to
a

prop* vi'1" tvi 31 1a t s

shaz e

:: f

tl: i€ • i : e t:i 1: emer 1 t

I *n- :

defendant now receives from the Panama Canal Commission.
uhr-

l

enefit

relates

m&:

I ::i 1 1 to f f

a t t r i b u t a b l e to
parties
date .

to the period

the period

a n d ending

:i s

before

51 1 t:i t,3 ed

beginning with

wi fh t h e

1 1 a:i 1 1 t if f s co in 1 se 1

defendant s
i _•

23
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tl: 1a t the
Some of

the parti es

t ::> 1! 2

tl: i€ • 1: ^enef I t

the marriage
effective

were

of the

retirement

* a q u a 1 if ied

d o m e s t ic

relations

order

necessary

for s i g n a t u r e

arrangements

with

entitlement

cai 1

plaintiff's

b y t h e court

a n d to make the

the Commission
1.

be pi 'o^eriv

30 that
^ated

the

;nd L..-aid

directly to h e r .

In

accordance

^ltr. ' nc-

parties

a r e hereby

awarded

..t;;/a:^iion
,oir;t

chii drei 1 of bl: ie ma r^iage . : • '

entere ::i 2 ts

of .biild .:uppjrt

fi na ]

custody

f

ne p a r t i e s , t h e

jf "ne t w o minor

r'-'-- - .

and reasonable rights o f v i s i c a t i _ n
The issue

o:

>-* def endai 1 c

-•

. * ;,e _-x.a ..A* 1: : *

. o -ese* ,Ted

.

a;i ii "he court h a s
)t d :i * n sion

-

as detailed hereafter.
PROPERTY DIVISION
.1
dispute

.2

.rem ii
property

propert**

o>* r^n^r^v

- -ij ' -

separate

-:rj'^v. The
z

3Dove
Corp.

reia

itenupiiii

mi

:^T.r.?ri:

igreemei:1"

the

Applying those rulings to the evidence
determj 1 les

separate ^r-.;

ne lb ;^i,

tha t the fob 1 ow:i ng :i terns

.v parties:

PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY:
1.

All furn:i shings : ic w

1 Dca te I

i 11

the Enocl 1 1 louse

24

83

except that belonging to Linda Endrody,
2. The Cadillac automobile, and
3. All personal items of property identifiable as being
owned by plaintiff prior to the marriage.
(The parties stipulated

during the trial

that the Cadillac

and

the furnishings in the Enoch house could be so treated.)
DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE PROPERTY:
1. A 1/3 undivided interest in the Ranch except for any
increase in value attributable to use of marital funds,
2. Any equipment, machinery

or other personal property

owned prior to the marriage and used on the Ranch, and
3. Any equipment, machinery or other
in

which

the defendant

marriage except for

held

an interest

personal property

at the

time

of the

any value attributable to the expenditure of

marital funds.
The following

are items of marital property which should be

divided equally and fairly between the parties.
MARITAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES:
1. Any

value of

the defendant's

1/3 interest

in the

Ranch attributable to the use of marital funds or assets.
2.

Any

farm machinery,

equipment

or other

personal

property acquired during the marriage.
3. Any holdings, stock or other interest in the Corp.,
25

4. The identified retirement benefit,
5. Any other vehicles,

furnishings, cash, earnings, or

property not specifically discussed

above which were acquired by

either party during the marriage,
6. The shares held by defendant in the Trust, the court
having ordered that 1/2 of the shares in the Trust which are held
in the name of the defendant as of the

time of trial are subject

to a constructive trust and are held by defendant for the use and
benefit of plaintiff,
7.

Any tax

refunds attributable

to any

part of

the

acquired during

the

period of the marriage,
8.
marriage by

Any

mobile home

or

the parties, except

trailer

the horse trailer

belonging to

Linda Endrody,
The court having now determined
in this case and having
various

items of

appropriate

to

applied

entered certain orders herein as to

property
set this

the law to be

are

to

matter

for

be treated,
further

it

now

how
seems

argument or

the

presentation of evidence on the following matters:
1. The

values to

be

fixed for

the various

property

interests identified above for separate and marital property.
2. The

value

of

the

parties, and whether outstanding

debts and

obligations

of

the

debts are chargeable as marital
26

485

obligations or individual obligations.
3.

The proper

division

of

marital property

between

these parties.
4.

Determination

of

a

proper

alimony

award

after

property and debts have been valued and divided.
5. Determination

of a proper

child support assessment

after property and debts have been valued and divided.
6. Determination regarding

the assessment of

attorney

fees, after the property and debts have been valued and divided.
7. Any remaining unresolved issues.
Accordingly,
Motion Calendar
County

this

matter is

on October

ordered

4, 1993,

Courthouse in Parowan, Utah for

may become necessary.
be present at the
The trust

set on

at 9:00

AM,

the

Law and

in the

Iron

review and scheduling as

The plaintiff and defendant are ordered to

above time and place along with their counsel.

defendants

need not

attend, but

may do

so if

they

choose, in person apd/or by counsel.
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this

day of September,

1993, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION, first class postage prepaid, to the
following:
James M. Park, Esq.
P. 0. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 34721-0765

Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
P. 0. Box 1083
Cedar City, UT 84721-1083

Michael A. Day, Esq.
90 East 200 North
P. 0. Box 400
St. George, UT 84770
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ADDENDUM B:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(excluding Exhibit A)

MICHAEL A. DAY - A5463
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE,
WADE & SMART
A Professional Corporation
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771-0400

QM>-

801/628-1611
File #737501/wp8

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,
Plaintiff,

|
|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ,
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC.
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M.
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY,
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,

Civil No. 914900027
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of
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record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. The Court
previously entered a Memorandum Decision, on September 21, 1993, which left open
certain issues to be addressed at the November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, after
hearing additional evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following Findings of Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that its Memorandum decision, filed on September 21,

1993, should be incorporated into these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
said Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by this reference.
2.

The Court finds that it is clear and unambiguous that the Defendant

transferred his one-third interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust on or about
October 9, 1984, upon which transfer of all of the reanch property had been conveyed
to the Endrody Trust. The provisions of the Court's Memorandum Decision indicating
that the Defendant had retained a one-third undivided interest in the ranch property, or
that only two-thirds of the ranch property was conveyed to and held by the Endrody
Trust, should be amended and modified to incorporate this finding.
3.

With respect to the Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, the Court

finds that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust, that the claims of the Plaintiff
against the Trust, its beneficiary and its trustees are unsupported and should be
dismissed, and that the property held by Endrody Trust, including the ranch property,
the Cedar City home, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch home, and the personal
property belonging to the Endrody Trust are not marital assets and are not available
for distribution between Plaintiff and the Defendant, but are items of property
belonging to the Endrody Trust.
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4.

The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital

assets and should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court finds that these items of farm
equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage:
Equipment

Value

a.

Cultivator

$150.00

b.

Snapper Lawnmower

c.

JD Lawnmower

$400.00

d.

Heston Swather

$5,500.00

e.

Double rake

f.

Wire baler

g.

Corn planter

h.

Leveler

i.

JD 2750 Tractor

$13,000.00

j.

JD 3 bottom plow

$1,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff:
5.

$75.00

$75.00
$5,000.00
$500.00
$2,500.00

$29,325.00

The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital

assets and should be awarded to the Defendant. The Court finds that these items of
farm equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage:
Equipment
a.

Hoe and Bale Wagon

b.

Hay loader

c.

JD 4230 Tractor

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant:

Value
$12,000.00

$1,000.00
$13,500.00

$26,500.00

The Court also finds that the Defendant should be awarded, as his separate
property, other items of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which were
acquired by the Defendant prior to the parties' marriage.
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6.

The Court finds that various cattle were acquired and sold during the

period of the parties' marriage, but that all cattle have been sold and no division of
cattle is necessary.
7.

The Court finds that the parties have acquired 6,000 shares of stock in

Endrody Trucking, Inc., during the period of the marriage; that said shares should be
treated as marital property; and that it is fair and equitable that the Plaintiff receive
3,000 shares and the Defendant receive 3,000 shares.
8.

The debts acquired by the parties during the period of their marriage,

including any periods of separation, should be assumed and satisfied as follows,
except as otherwise provided herein:
a.

Plaintiff should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred by

her during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties'
separation;
b.

Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred

by him during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties'
separation; and
c.

The Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debt owed

to Mark McKim.
9.

The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties' minor children, Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody
and that Plaintiff should be entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with said children.
10.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant, as and for

child support for the parties' minor children, $177.00 per month, which amount is
consistent with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court further finds that
any modification of child support should be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's
Child Support Guidelines. Said child support payments should continue until each
child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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child support obligations in the event that either of the parties' minor children has
special needs which warrant a continuation of child support.
11.

The Court finds that each party should be required to keep and maintain

medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children, when it is available
to them at a reasonable cost or through their respective employment. Each party
should be required to pay one-half of all medical and dental expenses incurred by the
parties' minor children which are not covered by health or dental insurance.
12.

The Court finds that the Defendant should prepare and submit

documentation of insurance records and medical and dental bills to the Plaintiff, and
that the Plaintiff should be required to reimburse the Defendant for one-half of those
expenses if there are medical or dental expenses which are not covered by then
existing insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the parties' children and
to pay those medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, should end as
each child reaches the age of majority.
13.

The Court finds that rent was incurred by the Plaintiff, due to her

occupation and possession of the Enoch home, belonging to the Endrody Trust, at the
rate of $850.00 per month over a 24 month period, for a total rent due and owing to the
Endrody Trust of $20,400.00. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible
to pay and satisfy one-half of this rent amount, being $10,200.00, and that the
Defendant should be responsible to pay and satisfy the remaining one-half of said rent
amount being $10,200.00.
14.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony from the

Defendant in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of
December, 1993. Alimony should terminate upon the death, remarriage or
cohabitation of the Plaintiff or upon further Order of the Court. This alimony award is
based upon the Court's finding that the Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that the
Defendant has the ability to pay a reasonable sum for alimony, and the Court finds
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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that, based upon the respective circumstances of the parties, $300.00 per month is a
reasonable sum for alimony.
15.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's evidence at trial showed that she had

incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25, with costs in the total amount of
$1,431.50. The Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's
fees, the sum of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the
Defendant toward Plaintiffs attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing the
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees.
16.

The Court finds that the Defendant was previously found in contempt of

Court and that the Defendant should pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff for said contempt,
which amount will reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably
incurred by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's contempt.
17.

The Court finds that the 1,101 shares held by Defendant in the Endrody

Trust are marital assets and should be equally divided between the parties; that 550
1/2 shares should be awarded to Plaintiff and should be held in constructive trust by
the Defendant, under which the Defendant should continue to hold title to said shares
and Plaintiff should be awarded full use and benefit of said shares, including voting
and distribution rights. The Court further finds that if the Trust makes any distribution,
in any form, to its shareholders, then that portion of said distribution associated with
Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares should be held by Defendant, in trust for
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff should be offered her portion of any distribution to shareholders
before any other application of the funds, including reinvestment.
18.

The Court finds that the Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in

connection with the above-referenced constructive trust, and that Defendant should
forward to Plaintiff any notices or information disseminated by the trust to Defendant,
regarding trust meetings or other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial
interest in the trust shares or her rights with respect thereto.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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19.

The Court finds that the parties have stipulated that Plaintiff is entitled to

one-half of all retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant from the date of the
parties marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until the Defendant retired on or
about December 14, 1991. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to onehalf of the retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant during that period of time.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, concludes that the
foregoing findings constitute a complete and final determination of the Court relating to
issues of the case of Endrodv v. Endrody. Iron County Civil No. 914900027, and that a
Decree and Judgment should be madejand entered jn accordance therewith.
DATED this ^

day of

District Court Judge
Approved as to Form and Content
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the .Tys^day of July, 1994, I served a copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the
following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
James M. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM
965 South Main, #3
P. 0 . Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
P.O. Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083
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ADDENDUM C:

Decree and Judgment

MICHAEL A. DAY - A5463
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE,
WADE & SMART
A Professional Corporation
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771-0400
801/628-1611

4>

Mike Day:Endrody 737501 :Judg/Decre 082294 737501 mad ps

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,
i

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ,
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC.,
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M.
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY,
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L.
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,

Civil No. 914900027
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of
record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. After trial of
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the matter on August 25, 26 and 27, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision,
on September 21, 1993, which left open certain issues to be addressed at the
November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, having heard additional evidence, and being
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, its real and personal property

and its trustees and beneficiaries and against Endrody Trucking, Inc., are dismissed,
with prejudice.
2.

The marital assets of the Plaintiff and Defendant, acquired during the

course of their marriage, are divided and awarded as follows:
a.

There is no real property owned by the Plaintiff and Defendant and

no division of real property is necessary.
b.

Personal property:
(1)

To the Plaintiff:

Equipment

Value

a)

Cultivator

$150.00

b)

Snapper Lawnmower

c)

JD Lawnmower

$400.00

d)

Heston Swather

$5,500.00

e)

Double rake

f)

Wire baler

g)

Corn planter

h)

Leveler

i)

JD 2750 Tractor

$13,000.00

j)

JD 3 bottom plow

$1,500.00

$75.00

$75.00
$5,000.00
$500.00
$2,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff:
Judgment and Decree
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(2)

To the Defendant:

Equipment
a)

Hoe and Bale Wagon

b)

Hay loader

c)

JD 4230 Tractor

Value
$12,000.00
$1,000.00
$13,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant:
c.

$26,500.00

Defendant is awarded, as his separate property, other items

of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which are not listed above and
which were acquired by the Defendant prior to the marriage of Plaintiff and
Defendant.
d.

All other items of personal property acquired by Plaintiff and

Defendant during the course of the marriage shall be held by the party now in
possession of such personal property, in accordance with the prior Orders of the
Court, which are not inconsistent with this Judgment and Decree.
3.

There are currently no cattle which are owned by the Plaintiff and

Defendant, and no award or division of cattle is necessary.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded 3,000 shares of stock in

Endrody Trucking, Inc.
5.

The Plaintiff and Defenant are ordered to assume and satisfy the debts

incurred during the period of their marriage, including any periods of separation, in the
following manner:
a.

Plaintiff is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by her individually

during the period of the marriage and during the period of her separation from
Defendant;
b.

Defendant is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by him

individually during the period of the marriage and during the period of his separation
from Plaintiff;
Judgment and Decree
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c.

The Defendant is also ordered to satisfy any indebtedness owed by

either Plaintiff or Defendant to Mark McKim.
6.

Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children,

Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody, and Plaintiff is granted reasonable rights
of visitation with said children.
7.

Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, as and for the benefit and support of the

minor children, $177.00 per month, as and for child support, which amount is consistent/
with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Any future modification of child support
shall be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's Child Support Guidelines. Said child
support payments shall continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with
the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue the child support obligations of Defendant in
the event that either of the minor children has special needs which warrant a
continuation of child support.
8.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to keep and maintain medical

and dental insurance for the benefit of their minor children, when such insurance
coverage is available to either or both of them at a reasonable cost or through their
respective employment. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to pay one-half of all
medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor children for any medical or dental
expenses which are not covered by health or dental insurance.
9.

Defendant is ordered to prepare and submit documentation of medical and

dental bills of the minor children, together with documentation on insurance payments
for such bills, and Plaintiff is ordered to pay directly, or, where appropriate, to reimburse
the Defendant for one-half of those expenses which are not covered by then existing
insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the minor children and to pay for
medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, shall end as each child reaches
the age of majority.

Judgment and Decree
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10.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, the sum of

$10,200.00, representing one-half of the past due rents owed to Endrody Trust for
Plaintiffs occupation and possession of a Trust owned residence. Defendant is ordered
to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, $10,200.00, representing one-half of the past
due rents owed to Endrody Trust as a result of Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a
Trust owned residence.
11.

Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony and Defendant is ordered to pay

alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of
December, 1993. Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff shall terminate upon
the death, remarriage or cohabitation of Plaintiff, or upon further Order of the Court.
12.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees, the sum

of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the Defendant
toward Plaintiff's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing and is ordered to pay the
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees incurred in this matter.
13.

As a result of the Court's prior finding of contempt against the Defendant,

the Defendant is ordered to pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff, which amount is meant to
reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with
Defendant's contempt.
14.

The Court orders that the 1,101 shares in Endrody Trust, which are

currently held by Defendant, be awarded to the parties as follows:
a.

With respect to 550 1/2 of said shares, Defendant should continue

to hold title to said shares and continue to exercise all rights and receive all benefits
associated with said shares, including voting rights and rights of distribution.
b.

With respect to the remaining 550 1/2 shares, said shares should

be held in constructive trust by Defendant, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff. Defendant
shall continue to hold title to said shares, while Plaintiff is awarded full use and benefit of
said shares, including voting and distribution rights.
Judgment ana Decree
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c.

In accordance with the above-referenced constructive trust, upon

any distribution to shareholders by the trust, Defendant is ordered to hold that portion of
said distribution associated with Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares, and
Defendant is ordered to notify Plaintiff of said distribution and to offer Plaintiff her portion
of any such distribution before any other application of the funds, including
reinvestment.
d.

Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in connection with the

above-referenced constructive trust, and Defendant is ordered to forward to Plaintiff any
notices or information provided to Defendant by the Trust, regarding Trust meetings or
other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial interest in the trust shares or her
rights with respect thereto.
15.

Plaintiff is awarded one-half of the retirement benefits accumulated by

Defendant, from the date of the parties' marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until
the Defendant retired on or about December 14,1991.
16.

The parties shall cooperate in executing such documents as may be

necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Judgment and Decree.
17.

Should any party fail to comply with the provisions of this Judgment and

Decree, the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to any costs or expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in enforcing the provisions hereof.
18.

This Judgment and Order shall become final immediately upon entry by

the Court.

Judgment and Decree
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Approved as to Form and Content

JAMES M. FfcFfk, E§Q.
The Park Firm
^
Attorneys for Plaintiff

LASZLO ENDRODY, JR.
Defendant, Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

_, 1994, I served a copy

of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
James M. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM
965 South Main, #3
PO Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
PO Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083
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Approved as to Form and Content

JAMES M. PARK, ESQ
The Parj^Fin
Attorneys for/Plaintiff

LASZLO ENDRODY, J.
Defendant, Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of (f^(z6.

. 1994,1 served a copy

of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
James M. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM
965 South Main, #3
PO Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
PO Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083
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ADDENDUM D:

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)

(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order: notice to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing.
Within iO days after filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not
already on file as the appellant deems necessary.
The request shall be in writing, and, within the
same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a
compressed format, appellant shall include the
request for a compressed format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same
period the appellant shall file a certificate to that
effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy
with the clerk of the appellate court. If there was
no reporter but the proceedings were otherwise
recorded, the appellant shall request from a court
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules
and procedures of the Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by the appellate
court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The
clerk of the appellate court shall, upon request,
provide a list of all certified court transcribers.
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations
imposed on reporters by these rules.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If
the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court
nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation
by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be
included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of
the issues that will be presented on appeal and
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the
appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall,
within 10 days after the service of the request or
certificate and the statement of the appellant,
file and serve on the appellant a designation of
additional parts to be included. Unless within 10
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so notified
the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in
the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.

ADDENDUM E:

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a)

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal:
recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may include single
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing partv The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or
by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper.
(o Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A
party may request damages under this rule only
as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion
or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or
the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded.
The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The
order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a
hearing.

ADDENDUM F:

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)

Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless
specifically required or prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record,
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in
the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of the reporters transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal:
and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When
costs are awarded to a party in an appeal, a party
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon
the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial
court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of

costs, serve and file a notice of objection, together
with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within
the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax
the costs as filed and enter judgment for the* party
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as
in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the
clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax
the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the
case of other judgments of record. The determination
of the clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court
upon the request of either party made within 5 days
of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the court, including
appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days
after the expiration of the time in which a petition for
rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an
order denying such a petition, the party to whom
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of
the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse
party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have
the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost
bill is filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall
thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against

